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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
l'TAll STATI~~ BUlLDTl':G BOARD,

Plain.tiffs,

- vs(H:OH<H~ H. ROl\fNEY and M. WALLIN BO~I XI 1:Y, d-h-a G. MAURICE
no~~~ l':y C01\1P ANY, a partnership,

Pt nl.

Case
No.10128

[)l'jendants, Third-Pa-rty Plaintiffs,
and Appellants,
- vsf~Dr~TBL\L INDEMNITY COMP.\XY, a corporation,
J'hird-Parfy DefPHdant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' REP·L Y BRIEF
ARGU~1:ENT

POINT I.
THE PRETRIAL ORDER WAS NOT A FINAL JUDG:\[ENT FRO:JI WHICH AN APPEAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN
TAKEN.

This Court has previously denied Respondent's
~[otion to Dismiss the .appeal. However, since Respondt 'n t has again brought this question into focus under
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its Point IV in Respondent's brief, Appellants must
reply to Respondent's argun1ents.
A. THE PRE-·T·RIAL ORDER WAS INTERLOCUTORY IN FQR.M AND SUBSTANCE.
1. The Court reserved the right to change the PreTrial Order.
A Pre-Trial is by its very nature and form a preliminary order defining the issues to be tried at the
subsequent trial. It is susceptible of modification after
the Pre-·T'rial hearing, thereby reserving to the Court
the power and jurisdiction to change it. The Pre-Trial
Judge in this case expressly made this reservation in
Paragraph 17 thereof: (R. 228)
"It is ordered that no further amendments
be permitted to the pleadings or to this order
except for good cause shown and to prevent manifest injustice." (Italics added)
In the case of David v. Goodman, (Calif.) 200 Pac. 2d
568, and again in Hunter v. Merger Mines Corporation,
(Idaho) (1945) 160 Pac. 2d 455, the Courts held that in
cases of such reservations, the order of the Court was
not final and an appeal would not lie therefrom.
In Maybury v. City of Seattle (Wash.) 336 Pac. 2d
878, the Court held that a Pre-Trial Order limiting the
issues to be tried was not a final appealable order. See
also Green v. Green, (Tex.) (1952) 247 S.W. 2d 583, and
Meehen v. Hopps, (Calif.) <19·55) 288 Pac. 2d 267.
Certainly, in view of the prevailing practice relating
to Pre-T'rial Orders, in view of the specific wording of
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t h~> Onlt•r it::;.-ll', and undt•r t lu· a hove cas(':-', appellants
\\'<'!'~'

rig-htfully entitled to n•ly upon the Pre-Trial Order

l):•ing intPrloeutnry in nature.
~.

. In urrlf'r for

dismissal is not a fina.l judgment.

In Parag-raph 17 of the Pre-Trial Order, (R. 228)
tht> ( ~ourt said:

"It is ordered that the action insofar as the
lndnstrial lndeinnity ,Company, a corporation, is
e<·tw<'rnPd. lw dismissed with prejudice."
ThiH statPnwnt is not a final judg1nent from which an
app<'al will li<'. Tn the case of Attorney General of Uta.h
v. Pomeroy, et al, 93 Utah 426, 452, this Court in setting
t'nrth the gen(•ral rules relating to the finality of various
ordf:lrH, Htat<'d that no appeal would lie when an " ...
ordl'l' for but no judgment of dismissal is entered. Lukich
r. Utah Construction Company, 46 Utah 317."
In Lukicll, supra, after the plaintiff's case had been
CCll!tpldPd, defendant made a motion for a non-suit,
which motion was granted. In the transcript of the record
:l}ljH'HI'S

this:

"In this case, the Court sustains the motion
for a non-suit and judgment for non-suit may be
granted."
There "·as attached to the transcript a document entitled,
"EntPred Order," which stated in part:
"The ·Court having considered the defendant's
motion for judgment of noli-suit and dismissal
herein, and being fully advised in the premises,
it is ordered that the said motion be, and it is,
hereby sustained."
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In holding that such an order was not a final judgment, the Court said:
"The recitals at most but show an order
granting a non-suit, or directing a judgment of
non-suit. It does not show a judgment, one in
fact rendered or entered. From what is recited,
it may be said the case was sent out of court.
But that a judgment was in fact rendered or
entered is left to argument and discussion. If a
judgment was rendered and entered, it ought to
appear by the court's record and the Judgment
Book . . . That has not been done. Until so done,
we cannot possibly know that a judgment has
been rendered or entered."
It is thus clear that the judgment finally entered
pursuant to said Order was not properly filed and entered until April 2, 1964, (R. 233-235) and thus the appeal
was timely made.
3. The Pre-Trial Order did not comply with Rule
54 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 54 (b) provides, as follows :
''(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Clauns. When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, a final judgment may
be entered upon one or more but less than all of
the claims only upon an express determination by
the court that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such determination
and direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates less than
all the claims shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims, and the order or other form
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of d1·<·i:..;ion i~ ~uhjt>d to revision at any tim<' bel'on• t hl' entry of jndgtll<·nt adjudicatiHg all tht•
dui m~."

l.n th·· Pn•-'Crial Onh•r, thl•re :..;pt>eifically is no determinatiPn tltnt "th<'rt' is no just n•ason for delay." Thus
by tlw v<·ry provi~ion~ of said rule, the Order cannot
be final. lind tlwn' been smne reference to the rule, or
had tiH•rp lwPn <·ompliancP with its provisions, then assuming t!w ( )rder is one capable of becoming final, it
it l'ai r to assmm• the appellants would have been placed
on noticP a~ to its claimed finality. Since there was no
~neh rPI'en•JH'P or c01npliance with the rule, the Order
i~ not t'i nal.
I\ ult• 54 <b) is identical to Rule 54 (b) of the Federal
Hui<'S of Ci \'i l Procedure. In 6 .lvloore' s Federal Practice,
pag't's :20-t-:21 :2, there is an extensive discussion of the
purpo::H's of this rule, which discussion can best be summarizPd by the ..:\dyisory Committee's notes, a portion
nt' ,,·hieh rt>:.Hl:_.;:, as follows:

"The mnended rule is designated to make
clt•m· that interim adjudications disposing of
sonw. but not all, of the claims, counterclaims,
cro~~-claims and third-party claims arising out of
a ~ingle transaction or occurrence are generally
pn)\'i:sional. Judgment is not to be entered until
a 11 of such claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and
third-party claims are determined, unless the
court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delaying judgment as to the claims
adjudicated and expressly enters a final judgment thereon. Thus the rights of the parties are
protected and, except in the case where a specific
final judgment is entered as to some but not all
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claims as aforesaid, one appeal will suffice to
present all of the rulings to the appellate court."
Again, on page 207, Moore states in citing Dav,id v.
District of Columbia, (CA D.C.) (1950) 187 Fed. 2d
204, 206:
"The District Court is not obliged to enter
a final judgment until it has completely adjudicated the multiple claims action. The rule merely
prescribes that, when the District Court has adjudicated at least one clairn but less than all of
the claims, the Court 'if it does choose to enter
such a final order, must do so in a definite, unmistakable manner.'"
Rule 54 (b) does not, however, enlarge appellate
jurisdiction by making appealable judgments or orders
·w·hich otherwise would not be. Flegenheimer v. General
Mills Company, 191 Fed. 2d 237 (~CA 2d, 1951).
Therefore, the Court has a definite obligation to
specifically define a judgment in a multiple claims case
as a final judgment. Failing this, the judgment or order
is not final and matters included therein n1ay be raised
on appeal after disposition of the entire case.
B. IN SUBSTANCE THE ORDER IS NOT
FINAL.
Assuming arguendo that the Pre-Trial Order was
final in fonn and did comply with Rule 54 (b), it would
still fail as a final judgment. The Third-Party Complaint (R .. 8) and the Pre-Trial Order (R. 228) show
that respondent Bonding Company was charged with
liability for any bills which the appellant was required
to pay to the plaintiffs under the Utah Bonding Statute,
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SPdion t-l-1-1, L"tah CodP Annotated, 1953, as anwnded.
rrhe hond und~·r whieh appellants claimed over against
n-spondtmt (Pn•-Trial Exhibit 1) shows appellants as
,,jdi~~'"~ and tlw various plaintiffs and ereditors as benel'i<·iarit·s.
Tht> liability of the respondent to the appellants
wm~ contingent upon the Court's determining the extent
of appl'ilants' liability to the various plaintiffs or creditors. '1\> the Pxtent that appellants had to pay any of
:-;aid daims, tiH·n appellants were seeking recovery over
against respondent for that mnount on the bond. The
final liability of respondent to appellants could not,
tlwn•forl', be determined until a trial was had at which
tlw validity and amount of the creditors' claims were
determined. Obviously, if the creditors did not establish
their claims under the Bonding Statute against appellants, then appellants would have no claim over on the
hond against r(lspondent. In this event, appella~ts would
han• no objection to respondent being dismissed out of
the law ~nit. If appellants did have a claim over, then,
nf eonrst>, they would object to the dismissal of respondt•nt.
'rhis Court, in the Pomeroy, supra, case, discusses
at great lPngth the finality of judgments in cases involving multiple claims such as this case at bar. The discus~ion in the Pomeroy case involves various parties and
daims rather than cases cases involving merely a plaintiff and a defendant. The general rule followed in the
Utah eases prior to the Pomeroy case as enunciated in
:::nrh case as Oldroyd r. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 Pac.
;)~ll. and Xorth Point Consolidated Irrigation Company
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v. Utah and Salt Lake Canal Cornpany, 14 Utah 155, 46
Pac. 824, 826, is to the effect that the judgment must
dispose of all parties and all clalins in the case and must
finally dispose of the subject matter.
In Porneroy supra., the Court lays down the following rules in detern1ining the finality of a judgment for
purposes of appeal:
"We do not pretend to lay down a completely
comprehensive definition or test of what constitutes such a severable interest in a suit as to
make such judgment of dismissal final as to the
plaintiff and such defendant for purposes of appeal. But it seems that in order to be severable,
and therefore appealable, any determination of
the issues so settled by the judgment of dismissal
must not affect the determination of the remaining issues whether such judgment on appeal is
reversed or affirmed, nor may the determination
of the issues remaining affect the final determination of the issues between plaintiff and the dismissed defendant. If the determination of the
issues relating to the dismissed defendant will or
may affect the determination of the remaining
issues, the judgment of dismissal is not appealable. Perhaps another way of saying it would be
that the judgment is severable when the original
determination of those issues by the trial court
and reflected in the judgment or any determination which could be as the result of an appeal
cannot affect the determination of the remaining
issues of the suite, nor can the determination of
such remaining issues affect the issues between
plaintiff and the dismissed defendants if such
defendants are restored to the case by a reversal.
" . . . If the claimed basis of liability of the
dismissed defendants is connected with or so
related to the claimed basis of liability of the
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rPm a in in,!!;

dPI't·ndants

~o

that

olH'

Inay

a fft•d

the

ot ht>r, a .indgmPn t a~ to t ht- discharged defendants
i:-; not nppP<dahlP until thP issues as to the rPmain-

in.!!; defendants an• settled."

It

i~

e!Par in our easP that thP rights and liabilities
of the appellants and respondent are so
interrelah•d that a final disposition in the trial of the
t'rt>ditors' claims was necessary before any judgment
could IH' made falling under the Pomeroy rule.
rl'~JH'divPly

SU~LMARY

Xt•ithPr in forn1 nor in substance does the Pre-Trial
( )rdt•r a~snnH' a status of a final judgment. Appellants
han• PYPry rig-ht to rely upon the interlocutory nature
of tlw wording of the Order. Appellants are just as
t·ntitll'd to rt>ly upon the provisions of Rule 5-± (b) in its
dt•finition of the manner in which a final judgment must
btl f:'nh•rt>d in cases of multiple claims .
.\ppellants havp a just cause in holding respondent
to its bonding liability and should not be denied the
JH'OJWr appellate review of the issues raised by the trial
l'nnrt's dismissal of respondent. Appellants respectfully
snhmit that the appeal should not be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
lT.YDE, ~IECHA~I & PRATT
By
Elliott Lee Pratt
Attorneys for Appellants
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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